




Stability and Support Operations (SASO)



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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

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
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PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS REHEARSALS AT THE CMTC by CPT Mark Stammer

Since Peace Support Operations present a series of unique and unfamiliar roles for soldiers, full-mission rehearsals are essential for a successful deployment to Bosnia. Both collective and individual training and rehearsals conducted at the CMTC focus on the peace support mission. They are designed to prepare soldiers and units specifically for operations in Bosnia.


EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE IV *THE BENCHMARK IN COLLECTIVE TRAINING*

Exercise Mountain Eagle IV was a new experience - CMTC's first full task force peace support mission. CMTC personnel actually converted the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) to replicate conditions in Bosnia. To accurately maintain these conditions, CMTC personnel regularly deploy to Bosnia. They conduct on-site surveys of living conditions and attitudes of local populaces. They talk with soldiers and leaders, experience base camp quality of life, and observe units conducting the wide variety of peace support operations missions.

The goal is absolute realism.

Elaborate details to ensure an authentic operational environment at HTA include:

- ☛ **Populating five towns with the appropriate religious and ethnic mix of people.**
- ☛ **Establishing and maintaining infrastructures in these towns.**
- ☛ **Developing religious, political, military, social hierarchies in each town.**
- ☛ **Establishing an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and Areas of Transfer (AOT).**
- ☛ **Developing and maintaining Former Warring Factions (FWFs) with headquarters, training areas, and weapon storage sites (WSSs) on both sides of the IEBL.**
- ☛ **Maintaining appropriate non-government and private organizations (NGOs or PVOs) in the maneuver area to include:**
 - **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).**
 - **International Police Task Force (IPTF).**
 - **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).**
 - **International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).**
 - **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).**
 - **Brown and Root contractors.**
- ☛ **Constructing and maintaining fully operational base camps, guard towers, and checkpoints.**
- ☛ **Maintaining routes and patrol plans throughout sector.**
- ☛ **Developing personality profiles for all key role players in the maneuver area.**
- ☛ **Developing operational themes that begin at the very start of the rotation and culminate near the end (escalation, high intensity conflict, stabilization phases of peace support operations).**
- ☛ **Continuing documentation efforts for historical files dating back to the beginning of the**



Implementation Force (IFOR).

Because Mountain Eagle IV was unique, observer/controller (O/C) participation in the exercise differed significantly from a normal rotation. Initially, O/Cs facilitated and supported the mission rehearsal by replicating outgoing units at all levels from task force down to buddy team patrols. Documentation included SOPs, OPORDs, contingency plans, range cards, sector sketches, fire plans, patrol plans, and base defense plans. O/Cs based all documentation on current events and information, SOPs, and systems currently in place in their prospective area of responsibility (AOR).

O/Cs were careful to continually highlight teaching points during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of the operation. They emphasized emerging peace support operations doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). O/Cs intensified coaching, teaching, and mentoring efforts during planning and preparation to ensure maximum opportunity for success during execution. Since units conducting mission rehearsals do not have time to wait until the after-action review (AAR) to learn from their mistakes, discovery learning is essential throughout the entire exercise. Outstanding AARs, accompanied by comprehensive take-home packages, comprise the normal foundation for Home-Station training programs. In this case, however, at the end of this mission rehearsal, the unit deployed directly to Bosnia.

The entire CMTC Team quickly reacted to support the mission rehearsal. USAREUR also enlisted the assistance of senior active and retired Army leaders to mentor leaders of the deploying unit on the finer points of leadership, battle command, dealing with the media, and negotiating skills.


CMTC followed up Mountain Eagle IV by deploying a cadre to Fort Riley, KS. The mission was the same: to facilitate a peace support mission rehearsal for an infantry task force. This exercise marked the first time that O/Cs from the CMTC in USAREUR deployed to a unit's home station in the United States to facilitate a full-mission rehearsal.

CMTC has taken the leading role in facilitating full-mission rehearsals for peace support operations. The CMTC made all of its time and resources available to ensure the best full rehearsal possible for the deploying units. CMTC will do even better for Mountain Eagle V.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING



CMTC routinely conducts Individual Replacement Training (IRT) for USAREUR soldiers preparing to deploy to Bosnia. IRT offers soldiers the opportunity to train and rehearse the individual skills necessary to perform successfully and safely as part of a team in Bosnia. The IRT program is an intense three-day training cycle consisting of both classroom instruction and practical exercises. Figure 1 on page 3 depicts the IRT schedule.



Day 1. Inprocessing.

- ✓ Media Awareness briefing and interviews for some members of the class.
- ✓ Mine detonation demonstrates the effects of an M21 anti-tank mine against a 2.5-ton truck.
- ✓ Rules of Engagement (ROE) briefing to include General Order Number One.


Day 2. Round Robin classroom instruction and practical exercises.

- ✓ Mine Awareness.
- ✓ Counter-Mine Operations.
- ✓ First Aid.
- ✓ Convoy Operations.
- ✓ Environmental Threat.
- ✓ Situational Awareness.
- ✓ Force Protection.

Day 3. Two Situational Training Exercises (STXs) . Students form squads to negotiate each lane.

- ✓ Force Protection.
 - Patrolling.
 - React to Sniper.
 - React to Indirect Fire.
 - Evacuate a Casualty.
 - Negotiate trip wires, mine fields, and booby traps.
 - Interact with Host-Nation Personnel.
- ✓ Situational Awareness.
 - Media Interviews.
 - Vehicle Search.
 - Personnel Search.

Figure 1. IRT Schedule



Brigade Warfighter Exercises by LTC Brian Zahn, Deputy Commander, Operations Group

The CMTC conducted two USAREUR-directed brigade Warfighter (WFX) exercises last year. Each brigade had deployed to Bosnia. Both were still commanded by the same commanders. Both brigade staffs were still intact. The exercises marked the return to HIC operations (via BBS) for each brigade after a year's deployment to Bosnia. They also served as a barometer to help gauge how peacekeeping operations dull warfighting skills.

Although only one half of the brigades in USAREUR have executed a Warfighter exercise, the observations discussed below demonstrate potential trends. Currently the other two brigades in USAREUR are involved in recovery from Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD and are presently executing Operation JOINT GUARD.

Command and Control BOS

1. Staff coordination and crosstalk within each brigade *was excellent* during orders development as brigades planned for future operations.

Technique: Both brigades effectively used LOs. This ensured that subordinate units had redundant means of receiving and retrieving information from the brigade staff.


2. Battle tracking.

- *Adequate* when the battle rhythm was slow.
- Increased pace caused battle-tracking *difficulties*.
- *An inefficient TOC layout which hindered communications and crosstalk within the staff and difficulty handling the volume of information, resulting in a significant time gap between SPOTREPs received and delivered to the XO or Battle Captain, exemplify the types of problems incurred.*

Technique: Effective staff integration and coordination within the TOC is dependent on TOC layout. Information and TTP contained in CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, May 95, *Tactical Operations Center*, will be helpful to Brigade Executive Officers interested in effective TOC setups.

3. Staffs slow to develop COAs during the transition from attack to defense.

- Staffs presented more than one course of action to the commander but clearly had a "preferred" solution to the problem at hand.
- Each brigade was forced, by the tactical situation, to adopt a course of action the staff had anticipated but not fully developed during the defense COA process.



Fire Support BOS

1. Commander's guidance for fires often lacks the necessary detail(s) to effectively plan, synchronize, and deliver fires in support of maneuver.

Technique: While most commanders provide some guidance for fire support, often they do not adequately address the factors listed below. Make sure you address each of the following:

- ☛ **How** fires will be used to support the scheme of maneuver.
- ☛ **When** fires are critical.
- ☛ **Where** fires must be placed to support maneuver plans.
- ☛ **Restrictions** for fires to preclude interference with the scheme of maneuver.
- ☛ **Attack criteria.**
- ☛ **Engagement criteria.**
- ☛ **Guidance for special munitions** (smoke, laser-guided munitions, artillery FASCAM, etc.).
- ☛ **Counterfires** and use of **radars** (force protection priorities).

2. FSO's clear understanding of the commander's intent, and guidance for fires.

Technique: If the guidance is not given or is lacking in detail, ask the commander for clarification.

3. Maneuver commanders and FSOs do not rehearse the fire support plan in enough detail during the brigade combined arms rehearsal.

● **There is little, if any, talk about triggers, observers, and purpose of the targets in the brigade scheme of fires.**

● **The artillery battalion S3 frequently observes the rehearsal, but is not an active participant.**

Techniques:

A. The S3 should brief the battalion's scheme of movement (routes, azimuths of fire, etc.) to support the brigade, as well as addressing any special considerations such as FASCAM emplacement time and ammunition caches.

B. Do not use the rehearsal as a briefing of the plan. It is a final walk-through of the most critical aspects of the plan.

4. High payoff targets are not specific enough to be of value.

Techniques:

A. The commander should state his initial HPTs and the desired effects on those targets when he provides his guidance to the staff at the mission analysis briefing.

B. The staff should refine the HPTL during the development of each COA.

C. After COAs are analyzed and compared, an initial target synchronization matrix should be developed indicating:

- **the prioritization of the HPTs,**
- **what asset(s) will acquire (detect) each target,**
- **what assets will attack the target, the desired effects, and the requirements for assessment, and**
- **the assets tasked to conduct BDA.**



D. Conduct an effective targeting meeting to synchronize the unit's combat power and resources toward finding, attacking, and assessing the HPTs.

E. Finalize products.

F. Send a FRAGO to all subordinate units with the updated targeting products.

Remember, this process involves not only the fire support element, but almost all BOSs in the brigade combat team!

5. The brigade FSO must manage the location of the coordinated fire line (CFL).

Technique: Ask the brigade commander for his guidance on use of the CFL (purpose) and any restrictions or limitations he has on its placement.

☛ **Some commanders want the line to always be forward of the most forward friendly troop.** Others are comfortable accepting risk by allowing scouts forward of the CFL.

☛ **When scouts are forward, ensure all locations for these friendly units are accurate to prevent fratricide.**

☛ **When the CFL is applied doctrinally (e.g., to expedite attack of targets on the far side), the FSO must carefully select placement of the CFL to ensure some assets can range beyond the CFL to attack targets in addition to monitoring the locations of both friendly and enemy forces.**

6. The FSO must conduct mission analysis prior to any division deep operations.

Techniques:

A. Determine what specified tasks the brigade must perform.

EXAMPLE: ("Provide SEAD fires on targets AA1000 and AA1001 at H-0:13.")

B. Determine any implied tasks you may have to perform

EXAMPLE: (Establish an ACA from Route Hawk to OBJ Osprey.)

C. Develop your plan to accomplish these tasks. Generally, the brigade's support to a division deep attack consists of a SEAD plan.

D. Don't assume that you won't be involved in the attack of the objective. Contact the Division FSE for details on their next 12- and 24-hour missions.

Successful deep attacks begin with detailed coordination between the brigade and the division.

7. Synchronizing the effects of fires and maneuver requires detailed coordination among all members of the brigade staff. Effective synchronization relies on the FSO's ability to clearly understand the commander's intent for the operation and his guidance for fire support.

Techniques:

A. FSO should work closely with the S3 and his planner to integrate the detection and attack assets available to the brigade with the maneuver plan.


B. The FSO forwards requests for sensors and/or shooters to Division if a task exceeds the capabilities of the brigade.

C. During COA development and wargaming, the FSO synchronizes the fire plan with the other BOSs, refining the fire support products developed thus far (HPTL, FSEM, AGM, TSM).

D. Immediately following the commander's approval of a COA, the FSO completes his plan for fires. *At this time, the staff may conduct an additional synchronization drill focusing on the approved COA.*

E. The endstate is a viable fire support plan that is synched with maneuver.

F. Follow OPORD production and briefing with the brigade combat team conducting a combined arms rehearsal to finalize understanding of the brigade operation and to ensure synchronization of fires and maneuver.



Mobility/Survivability BOS

1. The Assistant Brigade Engineers (ABEs) and their sections were well integrated into the BCT's staff planning cycle. They were the key players in the future operations planning.

Technique: Above-average Situational Awareness and Battle Tracking allowed ABEs flexibility in BCT operations throughout the exercises. This strength was applied in crosstalk with Engineer Battalion TOCs to enhance the productivity of the Direct Support Companies.

2. All rehearsals and backbriefs included attendance by the company commanders, battalion staff, assistant brigade engineer, and the battalion commander.

- **Company commanders briefed their tasks and purpose for all phases of the operation.**
- **The battalion staff responded to any change in the CSS operations for both specified and implied requirements, thus synchronizing the M/S BOS.**

3. Obstacle Intelligence reporting and dissemination were slow and often incomplete. This created confusion for follow-on units throughout the BCT sector. The ABE cell would receive the report and pass it to the engineer battalion TOC.

RESULT: Information was collected with no analysis and incomplete dissemination throughout the BCT.

Technique: The ABE and S2 should crosstalk to confirm or deny the situational template.

4. The Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) was inadequate. The EBA did not effectively depict the opposing force capabilities and the effects of terrain on both opposing force and friendly operations.

RESULT: A mobility reserve was not identified during offensive operations. Engineer timeline affected by adjustments that had adverse impact on the maneuver units.

Technique: Plan from the objective back to the LD to highlight terrain-driven implied tasks.

5. The transition from the offense to the defense was slow. Slow transition in both the planning and utilization of the engineer assets.

● **The lack of shaping of engagement areas and the slow siting of M1/M2 battle positions delayed the utilization of dig assets.**


● **The lack of synchronization, planning, and preparation within the brigade staff was the key factor for the late transition to the defense.**

Technique: Not offered.

6. The use of FASCAM or Situational Obstacles for both ground and air employment was not planned based on NAIs and TAIs, but left to targets of opportunity.

RESULTS:

- A. Use of FASCAM on targets of opportunity with little or no impact on the opposing force.
- B. The scheme of engineer operations never addressed the employment of FASCAM.
- C. Necessary crosstalk between the ABE and FSO was nonexistent.



Techniques: Artillery-delivered FASCAM is crucial to the deep fight.

A. Brigade: Enhance fires/obstacle-intent integration. Encourage FSO and ABE to work side by side.

B. Brigade: FSCOORD and Engineer should train/mentor/encourage junior officers (TF FSO, Co FIST and TF Engineer) to closely cooperate in planning artillery targets and obstacle groups.

C. Time your use of artillery-delivered FASCAM. Do not allow the OPFOR time to find prematurely emplaced minefields and bypass them.

D. ABE, FSO, S3 and S2 must work closely together to make sure obstacles, indirect fires, maneuver/direct fires and R&S dovetail.

Air Defense BOS

1. Air Defense participation. Transition from peace support operations back to high intensity operations makes it essential for the air defense battery commander to refocus attention on participating in planning for all operations and execute the air defense plan developed to support the tactical scheme of maneuver. Although these trends are based solely on one brigade CPX, these areas are indicative of areas where air defense battery commanders can make a positive impact on brigade operations.

Air defenders must refocus from their roles in peace support operations to the fast-paced, warrior mentality air defense roles vital to success during high intensity conflict.

2. The battery commander was well integrated into the planning and execution of follow-on missions. He forced himself into the brigade planning process to ensure brigade planners understood what the air defense unit brought to the fight.

RESULTS:

A. Air defense was fully integrated into the brigade plan.

B. Battery commander able to keep the brigade commander and staff updated on the air defense situation.

C. Battery commander able to make timely and coordinated modifications to the air defense plan.

3. Inadequate preparation of the Air Defense annex and OPORD.

Techniques:


A. Annex B of **FM 44-100, U.S. Army Air Defense Operations**, provides the format for the air defense estimate and air defense annex. The air defense annex is a stand-alone document. It outlines the enemy air threat and the air defense commander's concept. According to FM 44-100, page B-6, it "assigns specific air defense missions each unit must accomplish."

B. Verbal orders to subordinates may accomplish the mission, but provide no information to the rest of the brigade staff and tactical units on the proper utilization of air defense assets to combat the likely threat.

4. Ineffective initial planning for the brigade attack. The battery commander must fight the approved plan whether he has been in the planning process or not.

Technique: Full integration and coordination with the brigade staff will ensure the battery commander has a plan that supports the scheme of maneuver and the air defense priorities which were developed during the planning process.

Failure to be in the planning process may result in misidentified air defense priorities and subsequently an air defense plan which does not properly support the maneuver plan.



Intelligence BOS

1. The S2 sections made a considerable effort in the brigade TOC to coordinate the friendly and enemy picture for the entire staff.

- **Significant improvements in**

- the type of information collected,
- the organization of the S2 cell,
- the process of handling the information.

- **The brigade S2 sections actively maintained current assessments of the enemy situation and ensured other staff elements (FSO, ENG, ADA) were apprised of the current situation.**

- **The procedures used clearly helped categorize, maintain, and disseminate the bulk of information in an orderly manner (FM 34-3).**

2. The initial IPB process was positive. Understanding the IPB process and the effective initial preparation of IPB was above average.

- **During the initial mission analysis brief, the S2s presented and displayed detailed products (situation and event templates and MCOO).**

- **Collection of information, intelligence analysis, weather, and situational templating are all areas which were seen with positive results (FM 34-130).**

Technique: Effective use of Home Station during the initial preparation for operations:

- ☛ **developed data bases.**
- ☛ **significant effort to develop the correct templates for the initial set.**

3. R&S preparation and execution continually challenged both brigades.

- **The S2s lacked synchronizing the R&S plan with the staff and subordinate units.**

- **Sporadic monitoring of the R&S effort, especially during the initial phases of an operation.**


- **S2 section set the R&S effort into motion by writing the plan and completing a fairly detailed R&S matrix.** But, only took limited action to determine how well the plan was being executed (i.e., monitoring, supervising and execution).

- **Gaps in intelligence were uncovered, collection did not occur, and battle-tracking suffered.** S2 sections generally did not know the location, status, or immediate intent of assets tasked to cover NAIs. Staff elements must be involved in the detailed planning and execution of R&S to ensure assets are directed, redirected, and positioned correctly. R&S must be planned and executed cooperatively between the S2 and S3, but someone must actively manage the R&S effort throughout the battle(s). A working system for tracking/monitoring assets would have helped in this regard. Finally, for the R&S effort for the brigade to be successful, commanders must set the conditions for R&S to be part of the initial main effort (FM 34-2-1, FM 34-2).

RESULTS:

A. Conflicting guidance or no guidance provided to the subordinate units.

B. Gaps in the overall R&S effort could not be accurately determined or retasked to cover key NAIs.



4. S-2 sections generally had difficulties with battle tracking. In both missions, the S-2s had trouble maintaining the correct read without reconfirming with division G2. Several events contributed to this:

- Gaps in the R&S effort.
- Cumbersome TOC operations.
- Poor reporting.
- The most damaging to battle tracking was the absence of reporting from the TFs, once engaged with the enemy.
- Very little active communication occurred between the BDE S2s and subordinate S2s.
- Numerous instances of inaccurate and incomplete reporting severely hindered the S2 section's ability to track the battle and provide accurate assessments.
- Critical pieces of information were missing from the SALUTE/SALT reports provided to the S2 section.
- On several occasions, the S2 sections received reports on enemy disposition (type and location) and actions which were incorrect.

RESULTS:

- A. Improper assessment of the enemy.
- B. Quality of analysis flawed.
- C. S2 section was able to identify elements of the enemy, doctrinally, but unable to assess the location and disposition/composition of enemy forces due to incomplete reporting (FM 34-3).

5. Despite this strong initial step, event templates occasionally lacked the detail to determine an enemy course of action or were not developed at all for follow-on missions.

Although the initial phases of IPB process were well executed by the S2 sections in which they showed a strong understanding and had a firm grasp on doctrinal templates required, NAIs

- were not developed throughout the wargaming process,
- were not necessarily placed to determine a key event or ascertain an enemy decision, and
- were not arrayed through the depth of the battlefield.

Technique: In most cases, an event matrix, providing details on the type of activity expected at each NAI and its relationship to other events on the battlefield, would have helped in refining the template and focusing the collection plan (FM 34-130, 34-3).

Brigades that have not undergone the Warfighter experience would do well to use the observations and TTPs discussed above as part of the training plan for the Brigade headquarters. These TTPs can also serve as a guide for taking a hard look at brigade staff procedures and as an aid for walking all the BOSs through the complete plan, prep, and execute model under HIC conditions before executing a Warfighter exercise.

TRAIN TO WIN!




The most recent Peace Support Operations mission rehearsal conducted at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) posed a special challenge to the NCO. The operation in Bosnia is so diverse that NCOs from the First Sergeant down to the Section Chief have to be prepared to take charge of any and all missions. Most of the missions normally associated with officers will, at one time or another, be delegated to NCOs.

- ❖ **Receiving the mission.**
- ❖ **Issuing the order.**
- ❖ **Rehearsals.**
- ❖ **Pre-combat inspections (PCIs).**

Techniques:

- ✓ Centered on facts and sound assumptions.
- ✓ Relies on the use of resources on-hand.
- ✓ Organizes personnel and establishes definite responsibilities.
- ✓ Locks in personnel, equipment, and other necessary considerations for the entire period of the operation.
- ✓ Delegates authority to the lowest level that allows for proper command and control.
- ✓ Allows for coordination between all levels of responsibility.
- ✓ Is simple to prevent confusion.
- ✓ Is flexible to allow for necessary changes to the course of action.
- ✓ Has the means of control to allow for the mission accomplishment in accordance with the commander's intent.
- ✓ Is coordinated so that all elements fit together in a way that everyone involved understands the mission.



❖ **ISSUING THE ORDER.** Once the mission is planned and coordinated, it is very important that the NCO issues orders and conducts a backbrief as soon as possible. The key to issuing the order is for the soldiers to understand the plans, how they will execute them, and what end state is needed.

Techniques:

1. Issue the orders while observing the actual terrain on which the mission will be conducted.
2. If unable to view the actual terrain, use aids (maps, overlays, terrain tables, or terrain sketches) to assist your soldiers in visualizing the terrain. Ensure that everyone has copies of the operation's overlay and has oriented their map before you start the order.
3. Explain the mission in a way that your subordinates can visualize how you expect the mission to unfold.
4. Ensure all subordinates understand how their tasks fit into the overall plan of maneuver and support the intent of the mission.
5. Prior to finishing the order, have your soldiers back-brief you on tasks that you consider critical to accomplishing the mission.

❖ **Rehearsals.** Another important aspect of TLPs is the rehearsal. A successful rehearsal should identify any problems in the plan and confirm that everyone knows what to do.

Techniques:


1. The most important elements to consider when conducting rehearsals are:
 - ✓ **the state of training.**
 - ✓ **the orders issued.**
 - ✓ **the terrain and weather conditions expected.**
2. Choose the appropriate type of rehearsal. There are basically three types of rehearsals:
 - ✓ **Exercise with the entire element.** When the mission is complex, has many intricate parts, and you have the time and a secure area.
 - ✓ **Exercise at reduced intervals and speeds.** When you have limited space or you want to start at a slow speed.
 - ✓ **Rehearsal with key leaders.**

The most desired technique is a full rehearsal, which is important when you are conducting the mission with attachments.

3. Ensure that you emphasize situations that trigger contingencies.
4. Involve all the soldiers that will be in the mission.

❖ **Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs).** As the final step in the preparation phase, the NCO must conduct PCIs. Properly conducted PCIs ensure that everyone down to the lowest ranking soldier understands what is to be done and that soldiers possess all the required mission-essential equipment. Without PCIs, you will never know if you are ready for contingencies.

The NCOs are the backbone of the Army. Their leadership will take care of soldiers and ensure missions are accomplished to standard. *They must be ready for any challenge that comes their way.* ⚡



MOUNTAIN EAGLE IV LESSONS LEARNED: TTPS FOR THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION HANDBOOK, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND GRADUATED RESPONSE MATRIX by MAJ Shane R. Burkhardt, Mechanized Company/Team Observer/Controller

During peace support operations rotations at the CMTC, observations indicate units fail to adequately train their soldiers on the Joint Military Commission (JMC) Handbook, the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the Graduated Response Matrix (GRM). With the potential strategic consequences of individual actions, unit deficiencies in these areas can have far-reaching consequences. This article will provide some observations noted during peace support operations rotations at the CMTC regarding the JMC Handbook, ROE, and GRM and offer some techniques in unit preparation.


The majority of units conducting peace support operations at the CMTC suffer from the same severe handicap. They do not know the JMC Handbook. The Handbook is an excellent reference for those units deploying to Bosnia. It provides details of conditions that all sides must meet under the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). It discusses procedures SFOR units should take if these conditions are violated. Because of their unfamiliarity with the JMC Handbook, many units fail to respond appropriately to various scenarios. Here are the reasons why :

- Units fail to issue the JMC Handbook down to the squad and individual levels.
- Units do not validate their leaders' knowledge of the JMC Handbook.
- Units neglect to incorporate the JMC Handbook into rehearsals.

In short, prior training on the JMC Handbook, down to at least squad level, provides a definite advantage to the unit during its deployment to Bosnia.

In addition to failing to utilize the JMC Handbook, units also show poor individual knowledge of the ROE and the GRM and subsequent failure to incorporate the ROE and the GRM into decisionmaking and rehearsals. *Although units issue every soldier a ROE card, the majority of units fail to ensure soldiers' knowledge of the ROE.*

Leader comprehension of the GRM is equally inadequate. Many commanders simply repeat verbatim the GRM they receive from higher headquarters. Consequently, leaders fail to fully grasp the purpose and use of the GRM during operations; hence, they cannot explain it to subordinates. Leaders often show the GRM as a flow chart in the hope that soldiers can easily decipher it themselves. Yet one leader confessed that he would need an advanced degree in calculus to fully comprehend the flow chart himself. If junior leaders have trouble learning and using the GRM, more experienced leaders must present the GRM so that every soldier will be able to comprehend it. In peace support operations, leaders must commit themselves to making sure their soldiers fully understand both the ROE and GRM, validate their knowledge, and incorporate the ROE and the GRM into all rehearsals.



The following techniques will assist commanders training their units on the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM:

- ☛ **Disseminate Copies of the JMC Handbook to the Lowest Level.** Obtain the latest edition of the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM as soon as possible, reproduce at your installation reproduction facility, and distribute to lowest level possible. Remember, execution of the majority of peace support operations missions occurs at the squad and platoon levels.

- ☛ **Tab the JMC Handbook.** Not everyone has a photographic memory -- have your soldiers tab their JMC Handbook so they can quickly access a specific area.

- ☛ **Validate Leaders on the JMC Handbook.** Use scenarios to validate your leaders' knowledge of the JMC Handbook; written tests are excellent tools for this task. Permit leaders' use of the JMC Handbook during validation. This will familiarize leaders with the use of the handbook and demonstrate the value of a properly tabbed JMC Handbook.

- ☛ **GRM at the Individual Level vs the Leader Level.** Review the GRM and make it user friendly. Many units just repeat the GRM from higher headquarters down to their troops. Tailor it for comprehension at the individual soldier level.

- ☛ **Validate All Soldiers on the GRM/ROE.** Validate all soldiers on the GRM and ROE using scenarios and vignettes. Soldiers should know how to respond in any given scenario in accordance with the ROE. Leaders must reinforce the soldiers' right to self-defense at all times.


- ☛ **Rehearse.** Prior to every mission, make sure your soldiers rehearse the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM. A technique is to have the leader give a scenario or vignette and then choose a soldier to answer. This simple technique will adequately prepare soldiers to properly respond to almost any situation they may encounter.

- ☛ **Ensure Training Occurs throughout Deployment.** Probably the greatest threat to the soldier during peace support operations is complacency. Leaders must continuously train their soldiers on the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM during deployment to ensure complacency does not jeopardize their soldiers or their mission.


- ☛ **Incorporate Lessons Learned into Training.** Bring some perspective into your training: use Bosnia lessons learned (available on e-mail from the Center for Army Lessons Learned) to emphasize points on ROE and GRM training.

- ☛ **Update.** Ensure your soldiers have the latest edition of the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM. New editions are continuously being produced to follow the changing conditions in Bosnia -- inform soldiers at all levels of any and all changes in the JMC Handbook, ROE, or the GRM.

As leaders, it is your duty and obligation to ensure all your soldiers are properly trained and prepared to carry out the arduous and complex tasks of peace support operations. Ensuring soldiers know the JMC Handbook, ROE, and the GRM will greatly enhance a unit's ability to successfully accomplish its peace support mission and ensure the safe return home of its soldiers.☛



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
The GSG will have to perform Platoon Sergeant duties in many areas. His skills will need to be well established. This is not the time to learn. His knowledge of Rules of Engagement (ROE), raids, presence missions, and perimeter defense will need to be second nature. The GSG will concentrate on the gunline and ensure daily operations in the platoon continue as usual. His guidance and leadership to the gunline will greatly influence the ability of the platoon to accomplish its mission.

The chief of section's knowledge in platoon operations, the aiming circle, hasty survey, map reading, ROE, and advance party procedures will have to be strong. The gunline chiefs will have to take on more responsibilities. Any of them may be required to perform duties as the GSG. By taking charge and having more initiative, the section chiefs will enable the new platoon sergeant to perform his duties more easily. They still remain the first-line leaders for the soldiers.

The skills and knowledge of all soldiers in the platoon must be at a high standard. The primary areas that the soldiers must know well are: ROE, range cards, guard duty, and construction of fighting positions. Soldiers must also display a significant degree of initiative. Initiative is probably the most important factor that will lead to success. Soldiers who perform their duties and help others without being told make everyone's job much easier.

Success in a peace support operation can be achieved at Home Station by training all officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the next higher duty position and ensuring that they know their own jobs thoroughly. ☛





TRAINING AND RESOURCING THE QUICK REACTION FORCE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS OPERATION MOUNTAIN EAGLE IV, HOHENFELS, GE by MAJ Kenneth L. Deal, Jr., Grizzly 12

During the initial phases of operations in Bosnia, before the days of a permanent Guard/quick reaction force (QRF) at base camps, it was common for units to pass through base camps enroute to their final objective. These units would vary - maybe armor, maybe infantry. Regardless, during their layover, they would be tasked to provide QRF for their temporary home. Here are some TTPs on how to quickly and effectively use this temporary augmentation as a capable and reliable QRF.

A base camp commander has hundreds of daily problems to solve. But perhaps the most critical and time consuming is the control of the QRF. The quick reaction force poses two major problems:


1. Insufficient personnel in the tenant unit (normally a HHC) to provide the quick reaction force on a continual basis;
2. Visiting units can only fill the role for limited times due to other peace support mission requirements.

For a large base, the QRF is usually a platoon or squad. The size of the QRF depends on the threat. Obviously, the greater the threat, the bigger the QRF. The tenant unit does not have a cohesive platoon (or even a squad) that can remain on standby for an entire day. And it cannot afford to rotate out with another platoon the following day. Therefore, the QRF habitually comes from a company that is spending a few days at the base camp. Once a company is dedicated to the QRF mission, there is no time for it to do much else, except perhaps vehicle maintenance and recovery. But the real challenge becomes training the QRF and adequately resourcing it for the "tour of duty."

The real challenge: *Training the QRF and adequately resourcing it for the tour of duty.*

★ **Training:** Training is the responsibility of the base camp commander. This does not mean he must personally train the QRF tasks. But he must validate their skills. He can best do this through a standard detailed training program. The trainer becomes the leader of the outgoing QRF. Training tasks should include:

- a. Zeroing of all weapons (if range facilities are available).
- b. Movement techniques.
- c. Reconnaissance routes to each fighting position/tower.
- d. Fire and Movement rehearsals (throughout the base camp).
- e. Planning for possible security patrols outside the perimeter.
- f. Rehearsing as many contingencies as possible during all conditions.
- g. Detailed study of all base camp SOPs.
- h. Detailed review and examination on the Rules of Engagement (ROE).



★ **Validation.** Validation occurs when the incoming QRF has successfully executed several emergency drills under varying conditions. The process can be time consuming since all QRF shifts must validate to the same standards.

The bottom line is there are no A teams or B teams for the QRF; each must be as capable as the other.

★ **Resourcing:** Each unit assuming the QRF role has a different organization. A tank company does not have the density of squad assault weapons (SAWs) that a mech infantry company has. Because the mission rotates, every unit type can reasonably be expected to assume the role.

Technique: The base camp should maintain a standard stock of equipment to issue to each QRF.

→ **This makes the handover quick and efficient.**


→ **Base camp commander will not have to reorganize his base defense plan for each unit.**

→ **Equipment should include, but not be limited to:**

- a. PRC 127 - One for every team. This provides flexibility when attempting to control a crisis.
- b. Crew-Served Machine Gun - One per squad. The type depends on what is available.
- c. M-16 rifles - If a tank company takes the mission, they will come with M9 pistols. A QRF equipped with pistols does not have as much flexibility as one equipped with rifles.
- d. NVGs - One per man. The type depends on what is available.

The tasks assigned to the quick reaction force are not difficult. A well-trained platoon can assume the role and execute it quickly with minimal effort. The only variables are the time it takes to train a unit, the equipment the unit comes with, and having only one task for the unit, the QRF. Proper training and resourcing of the QRF ensures quick and seamless transition...and provides the security and responsiveness required when conducting stability and support operations.★





BASE CAMP COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE FIRING BATTERY

by CPT Terry Michaels, Senior Firing Battery Observer/Controller

What is the role of the cannon battery in peace support operations? Batteries and platoons do not maneuver along the battlefield to support a highly mobile maneuver force. Instead, the platoons remain in a base camp. They conduct presence missions or raids to support friendly operations. How does this change the demands on batteries and platoons? How do they prepare for peace support operations?


Make no mistake. The role of the field artillery battery has not changed. It is to put steel on target when needed by the maneuver commander. Operations within the peace support base camps have added new dimensions to the command and control of FA batteries and platoons, yet the elements of accurate predicted fire never change.

A major change occurs in the platoon operations center (POC). The POC can no longer rely exclusively on the FA battalion TOC for tactical information. In peace support operations, the POCs themselves become conduits of information between the maneuver battalion and the FA battalion HQ. They pass information just as the TF FSE passes tactical information during normal combat operations. This change in operations causes problems in the POCs. They include:

1. The command relationship between the FA platoons and the maneuver HQ in the base camp.
2. Flow of information to and from the maneuver base camp HQ.
3. Tracking friendly forces within the artillery's area of operations.
4. Increased responsibilities for the NCOs within the platoon.

Assign a liaison to coordinate conflicting priorities. Once the decision is made to position FA platoons and batteries within maneuver base camps, a liaison between that FA platoon/battery HQ and the maneuver HQ in the base camp becomes essential. The senior FA officer, either BC or platoon leader, and senior FA NCO, either 1SG or platoon sergeant, must establish a liaison with the maneuver HQ. The primary function of the FA representative is to establish a working relationship with maneuver that facilitates information flow between the platoon and maneuver HQ.

The information flow from the maneuver HQ to the FA platoon must be the same as if the platoon were a dedicated battery to that maneuver HQ. This does not imply that the FA platoon automatically comes under the operational control of the maneuver HQ. The FA battalion or force field artillery HQ controls movement, firing, and planning fires for the platoon. The platoon must track the maneuver operations within their umbrella of FA coverage. The POC becomes a small HQ which tracks patrols, observation posts (OPs), and convoys within the maneuver element's area of operations. These patrols, OPs, and convoys become the friendly unit locations that are normally tracked in a high intensity conflict.




Just as an air traffic controller has the responsibility to track all aircraft in his sector, the platoon HQ must track all operations occurring within the range of its indirect fires. Only by knowing what is going on can the FA platoon adequately provide support to those units that may need it. The POC tracks all information. But the platoon does not respond to the observer's calls for fire. Calls for fire still go through the FA battalion and are cleared at the higher echelons, then sent back to the platoons as a fire order. As soon as the platoon HQ receives updates on maneuver operations, the POC should update the FA battalion and serve as an additional set of "eyes." This helps the FA battalion's planned coverage for critical brigade events. The platoon should pass information from the maneuver HQ to the FA battalion; it should also pass information from the FA battalion back to the maneuver HQ. This ensures that all elements within the brigade are kept current on theater operations.

Techniques:

1. For the FA POC to track all information necessary for successful peace support operations, augmentation is essential. The POC must operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week. All personnel within the FA unit should be integrated into daily operations. Personnel that may be used within the POC include communication, the NBC NCO, maintenance, and HMMWV drivers.
2. Prepare now before you find yourself dealing with a maneuver commander that doesn't care about the FA platoon or tries to control the FA platoon as if it were his own indirect fire asset. Integrate the cannon crewmen into POC operations for cross training.

The responsibility on the platoon leadership has multiplied to include many functions the BC and ISG traditionally execute. The POC is the FA platoon's HQ element in that base camp. As such, it inherits many functions the battalion TOC is required to perform. In platoons without the battery commander, the roles of the gunnery sergeant and section chiefs are critical to the success of the field artillery operations. Each level of leadership is effectively moved up an echelon for responsibility purposes. Since the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are the coordination element with the maneuver HQ, the gunnery sergeant must step into the traditional platoon sergeant role. He should assist the platoon sergeant with normal platoon operations. Since the platoon sergeant must perform the ISG's missions, the gunnery sergeant picks up platoon sergeant missions. The chiefs in the light platoon must be aggressive and not wait to be told what to do. They are the key to safe operations. They should be ready to step up and assist the gunnery sergeant in the day-to-day activities of the platoon.

Peace support operations are no different from any mission the FA platoon has had before. The elements of accurate, predicted fire remain unchanged. What has changed is the command and control of the platoon, now located in a maneuver base camp. The sources which provide information to the platoon leadership are critical. Information flow from the maneuver element is essential for adequate fire support coverage. Everyone's job is important, especially in peace support operations. Junior leaders must step up and assist the battery and platoon leaders in the execution of their duties. The work of junior NCOs and section chiefs will make or break the firing platoons in the base camps. These NCOs will distinguish good units from great ones in peace support operations. ☸



RETURN TO HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT: RETURN TO BASICS

by MAJ KEN DEAL, GRIZZLY 12

Returning to high intensity operations from a peace support deployment creates many challenges for the returning unit. They range in scope from major command and control issues to SOP development and refinement. None, however, are as big as the loss of basic tactical skills at the platoon level.

The platoon is the tactical building block for every unit. Every maneuver platoon should have the ability to execute simple tasks such as movement formations, traveling techniques, actions on contact, occupying an assembly area, and occupying a battle position.

A baseline assumption is that each platoon has a basic knowledge and acceptable level of competence in these tasks (and others) to work as part of a company team. But, these skills are perishable. After a lengthy peace support deployment, the platoon's basic tactical skills will be understandably rusty. The challenge is how to bring the platoon back to the level where it can execute simple tasks with little supervision or guidance in a short amount of time.

Many units conduct a Grafenwoehr gunnery density prior to arriving at the CMTC. If a unit conducts gunnery training through Table XII, the platoon is forced to execute basic platoon-level operations. But as always with gunnery events, the focus is on live firing. Gunnery scores are tangible and, therefore, become the main event. The tactical events are executed, but there is very little effort (if any) to ensure the platoon meets the standard or retrains tactical shortcomings.


CMTC builds "E" days into the rotational schedule. E days are traditionally scheduled as STX lanes for the company. They usually culminate with a task force-mounted rehearsal. There is neither time nor space for the company commander to conduct platoon-level STX/battle drill training. Because the platoons are generally not trained to standard, the main focus of the company-level STX after-action review becomes individual platoon actions.

Technique: To correct this problem, execute platoon training during E days.

1. Prior to deployment, the unit must determine what critical tasks to teach during the platoon-level E days and identify an expert to focus on a "Leader Teach" of these tasks.
2. Once on the ground, run each platoon through a series of STX lanes designed to force the platoon to conduct basic platoon maneuvers.
3. Make the lane short enough so each platoon can execute the lane several times during the training period. (Each training period should be either 0700-1200 or 1300-1800.) After two days, each platoon will have conducted four separate lanes.
4. Each line company should have responsibility for a given lane. With adequate space, the company can establish the lane to accommodate three platoons. The platoons in the company stay together, and the commander is the senior trainer. Each company rotates from site to site after the training period is over.
5. The company XO stays at the original lane as the "LO" for the next training unit.

Because time is short, the lanes must be fully developed and rehearsed. If the preparation is done to a high standard, the training unit can roll on and off quickly, spending time training, not preparing to train.

The overall training objective is not to have highly skilled, fully trained platoons prior to the rotation, but rather to enter the "box" with confident, competent platoons that have a baseline of knowledge and experience. Develop these platoons by using a portion of the E days to train platoons and platoon leaders on the basics, making the transition back to HIC smooth and seamless.☺



PUTTING THE TACTICAL BACK IN THE TOC

by CPT Louis B. Rago, II, Assistant TF S3 O/C, Green Team, CMTC

One of the most critical aspects of a unit's transition from peace support operations (PSOs) back to war fighting is standing up the tactical operations center (TOC). At first glance the transition does not appear to be difficult. But difficulties experienced by units during recent rotations at the CMTC indicate that units returning from Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) and JOINT GUARD (OJG) share the same problems:

- ◆ **Difficulties in many aspects of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).**
 - **Poor time management.**
 - **Incomplete wargaming.**
- ◆ **Conducting battle staff operations.**
- ◆ **Performing basic TOC functions.**

TIME MANAGEMENT. The battle staff must strive to maintain its perspective on proper time management. An OJE/OJG task force staff normally provides a detailed plan for the execution of a single company/team or platoon mission. Two major factors tend to influence the battle staff's inaccurate estimate of the time necessary for subordinate commands to fully prepare for combat operations:

1. In PSO, the staff is accustomed to taking most of the time because they focus on one subordinate unit's mission and can provide the subordinate commander the "95-percent solution." Since very little refinement is required, the subordinate unit needs only the time necessary to brief, rehearse, and perform a pre-combat inspection on its soldiers.

2. Night operations are minimal in Bosnia. Staffs lose awareness of the time relationship between subordinate command preparation during daylight and hours of darkness.


Technique: Strict adherence to the "1/3-2/3 Rule" is often difficult for battle staffs that normally train for combat. Units that have lost focus of the necessity for disciplined time management after several months of PSO have an even greater challenge.

WARGAMING. Proper conduct of the wargame process is a perishable skill. Units returning from Bosnia experience great difficulty in conducting effective, thorough wargames.

1. Units participating in OJE/OJG are constrained by specific guidelines and relatively strict rules of engagement.

2. The possible foes in Bosnia have very limited capabilities compared to those of the OPFOR. Thus, units tend to treat the OPFOR as a cooperative enemy.

3. They seldom fully develop enemy courses of action based on the full array of OPFOR capabilities. This often leads to an ineffective wargame and the development of inadequate products.



BATTLE STAFF OPERATIONS. A poor wargame correlates to inadequate synchronization matrices and decision support templates. Many units returning from service in the Former Yugoslavia have forgotten the importance of these products. A major factor in the battle staff's inability to execute basic TOC functions during combat operations is the Graduated Response Matrix (GRM). In Bosnia many of the tactical decisions are limited by the GRM. The GRM withholds authority for the use of most combat multipliers at the brigade and division levels. This tends to significantly reduce the task force's reliance on these products.

TOC FUNCTIONS. Some basic TOC functions seem foreign to the battle staff after six to twelve months of PSOs. *The most significant function is providing recommendations and courses of action to the commander.*

◆ As indicated earlier, battle staffs tend to lose focus of important aspects of the MDMP and produce "tools" that are inadequate for war fighting.

RESULTS:

1. The staff often reacts to enemy actions rather than anticipating them.
2. The TOC loses situational awareness and is unable to provide quality recommendations to the commander.

◆ TOCs returning to combat operations also experience problems in the functions of receiving and distributing information.

➤ During PSO the TOC is normally required to command and control the actions of units over a relatively well known area with redundant missions.

➤ Daily missions for a task force in Bosnia are mostly conducted at the company/team level with only one or two units maneuvering at a time.

◆ Conversely, during combat, the TOC must control the movement of several subordinate commands simultaneously over a large and often unfamiliar area of operations.

RESULTS: This causes problems for a TOC accustomed to limited information flow.


1. Often the former OJE/OJG battle staff becomes overwhelmed by the amount and intensity of reporting as they return to combat operations.
2. Accurate recording of information received from subordinate units and timely dissemination to the remainder of the task force is often not accomplished to an acceptable standard.
3. This problem is prevalent with the primary TOC staff and is often compounded by a less experienced "second team."

◆ **TOC shift operations.** Operations in Bosnia are almost exclusively conducted during daylight hours.

➤ Units do not fully staff the TOC during hours of darkness.

➤ Allows the vast majority of the battle staff's experience to focus on the most important missions.

➤ Relegates the night shift into a radio watch rather than a fully functioning TOC crew.



- ◆ A serious disparity exists between most of the day and night shifts in units returning from PSO.
 - Limited manning.
 - Lack of key combat function representation on the night shift.


RESULTS:


1. Difficulty in coordinating tasks that routinely occur during the hours of darkness:
 - a. Counter-reconnaissance, counter-mobility operations, and survivability efforts were often not synchronized because of the lack of a fully integrated battle staff at night.
 - b. Night-shift personnel often did not adequately record or pass on information collected throughout the night.
2. Day shift receives inaccurate unit status and an unclear picture of the enemy situation. In some cases, the "first team" loses situational awareness before even engaging the enemy.

Key responsibilities of the battle staff and essential functions of the TOC often become dull during PSO. The task force must sharpen these skills to make an effective transition back to war fighting. There is no fast way to regain lost capabilities. Units returning from PSO should start retraining the battle staff immediately:

- ◆ **Review the basics of the MDMP and exercise the process through issuing the operations order.**
- ◆ **Exercise the TOC during command post exercises.** A few days of around-the-clock operations will allow the entire battle staff to sufficiently proof the TOC standing operating procedure and validate the integration of the different shifts.

It's hard to do. But reviewing the basics outlined here will help reinstate the focus in the TOC essential to the task force's ability to fight and win.☘






EIGHT KEYS TO SUPPORT BATTALION SUCCESS AT THE CMTC

by MAJ Howard R. Christie, ADLER 08 Support Operations O/C

Mission success for support battalions at the CMTC means getting tanks and Bradleys across the LD. To achieve this, CSS units must carefully examine how they plan, prepare, and execute combat service support (CSS) operations. The challenges posed by transitioning from non-linear peace support operations (PSOs) back to linear high intensity conflict (HIC) operations complicate the CSS planner's task. Here are some key techniques to help planners ensure timely and flexible support to maneuver units at CMTC:

- 1. Establish reliable, synchronized, and well-defined CSS systems to support a brigade combat team (BCT).**
 - ✓ Include all classes of supply, maintenance and services to achieve success for the supported units.
 - ✓ Train up and rehearse before deploying to CMTC.
 - 2. Develop a sound concept of support (COS) for the supported BCT prior to their arrival at CMTC.** The COS provides the framework for all CSS support to deployed units.
 - ✓ An effective COS clearly defines how units will receive support.
 - ✓ CSS planners must synchronize the COS to make certain they will provide the full spectrum of support.
 - ✓ Support battalions synchronize the COS with the brigade S-4 before the CSS rehearsal. Clear definition and synchronization allow all CSS planners and executors to understand and apply the plan.
 - 3. Rehearse.** Just as combined arms rehearsals contribute to tactical success, a CSS rehearsal improves support operations for the supported BCT.
 - ✓ Through rehearsals, logisticians convert support concepts to timely, appropriate actions.
 - ✓ Rehearsals validate synchronized plans, ensure continuity of supporting plans, and verify the sustainability of the tactical plan within the maneuver commander's intent.
 - ✓ When conducted with the right players, rehearsals remove anxiety from the maneuver commanders.
 - 4. Understand the maintenance and Class IX systems from crew level to direct support.**
 - ✓ With this understanding, planners can identify the weak links in their systems and correct the problem(s) as they occur.
 - ✓ Daily maintenance meetings are where CSS planners do this.
 - ✓ Useful meetings must have a defined agenda and a scheduled time (based on tactical and logistical operations), and the key CSS planners in the BCT must attend.
- RESULT:** Delivery of combat power to the BCT.



5. Plan and train to establish and maintain reliable, redundant tactical communications.

This includes logistics connectivity.

- ✓ **A unit that cannot communicate cannot support or win.** Each battle presents a new set of logistic requirements.
- ✓ **Units must communicate the logistic demands of this ever-changing environment, or it will not provide timely and accurate CSS support for the BCT.**
- ✓ **Redundant communication systems and determined soldier action to maintain positive communications spell the difference between logistic life and death.**

6. Establish a system of reporting and tracking to manage information systems.

- ✓ **CSS planners must have an accurate means to gather information, anticipate CSS shortfalls, and manage CSS systems.**
- ✓ **Without a CSS system, units cannot provide accurate tactical logistical requirements to the BCT.**
- ✓ **Exercise, refine, and incorporate the tracking and reporting system into existing standing operating procedures (SOPs).**
- ✓ **The bottom line for information management remains maximizing combat power for the maneuver commander.**


7. Conduct daily BSA tenants' meetings.

- ✓ **These provide the support battalions and the brigade staff excellent opportunities to integrate all tenants into the BSA.**
- ✓ **Synchronizes BSA operations: base defense and administrative issues as well as operational logistics (internal and direct support).**

8. Understand how maneuver units fight.

- ✓ **How the BCT will fight determines all logistic planning, including the best method to support.**
- ✓ **This requires broad tactical and technical proficiency.**
- ✓ **A logistician who fails to understand warfighting will not adequately track, anticipate, or provide timely CSS support to the BCT.**

CMTC provides many training challenges and opportunities to learn for support battalions. These keys to success are only a handful of the many lessons that a CMTC rotation teaches CSS units. Keying on these techniques allows units to get the most from their CMTC training experience.🔗



ENGINEERS RETURN TO HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT

by CPT Daniel Dolwick, Grizzly 12

Did your unit just return from operations in Bosnia? Are you finding it hard to figure out what you need to focus on to prepare your company for a high intensity conflict (HIC) rotation at CMTC? Let me make it a little easier on you. Here are some of the observations and lessons learned from fellow engineer companies that have already been exposed to the agony of their first HIC rotation.

1. Task-Force/Squadron Integration. In Bosnia engineers conducted missions such as bridging, construction, and mine clearing independent of the maneuver. Because of this, engineers' proficiency to interact with the TF staff has diminished.

Techniques:

- ☛ Collocate company command posts (CPs) with the TF TOC.
- ☛ Integrate with the TF staff for all operations.
- ☛ Ref FM 5-71-2, pg 2-15.

2. Company SOP. Daily operations in Bosnia became so routine that there was no need for a company SOP.


Techniques:

- ☛ Make sure your unit has an SOP.
- ☛ Make sure it contains pertinent information that the soldiers in your company must have to function.
- ☛ Include at least the following:
 - ✓ PCI checklist
 - ✓ Reports
 - ✓ Battle Drills
 - ✓ Chain of Command
- ☛ Make sure the SOP is compatible with the TF you support or your parent battalion.
- ☛ Every soldier should know the SOP and have a copy.

3. Use of Volcano. Recent rotations indicate a lack of understanding of the Volcano system on the part of TF leadership/staff.

Techniques:

- ☛ Discuss Volcano capabilities and limitations with the TF at home station.
- ☛ Demonstrate how the system works to the TF during an OPD/NCOPD.
 - ✓ The need for security and hide positions
 - ✓ Reload time and locations
 - ✓ Route planning
- ☛ Conduct rehearsals prior to employment.
- ☛ Ref FM 20-32 w/change 1, pg 6-23.



4. Use of MOPMS. The TF leadership/staff do not know how to utilize MOPMS.

Techniques:


- Discuss MOPMS capabilities and limitations with the TF at home station.
- Demonstrate how the system works to the TF during an OPD/NCOPD.
 - ✓ Show its footprint
 - ✓ Remote Control Unit (RCU)
 - ✓ Reporting procedures
- Conduct rehearsals prior to employment.
- Ref FM 20-32 w/change 1, pg 6-31.


5. Company/Team Deliberate Breach. Currently units are not taking full advantage of the engineer combat function when rehearsing for a company/team deliberate breach. During their mission analysis, the S2 and the TF engineer have templated or targeted enemy obstacle locations based on intelligence reports. The CO/TMs are not using that information to construct an obstacle of similar composition to rehearse. Units have not been designating support, breach and assault forces. The breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR) are not being achieved. The commander is not delegating responsibility to achieve these fundamentals to a specific force. No plan for redundancy in the breach force. Ref FM 90-13-1 w/change 1, chapter 3.

Techniques:

- Make realistic mockups of similar composition to use for rehearsals (i.e., 50m of wire and mines, BLUFOR, not OPFOR standards).
- Designate specific support, breach and assault forces.
- Emphasize the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure and reduce (SOSR).
- Assign responsibility to achieve these fundamentals to a specific force.
- Plan for redundancy in the breach force.
- Ref FM 90-13-1 w/Change 1, Chapter 3.

6. Soldiers' Field Craft. A tour in Bosnia accustomed some soldiers to a "base-camp" mentality. Recent observations show that field craft has slipped. Some examples are: noise and light discipline, use of camouflage and concealment, field hygiene, weapons cleanliness, not following load plans.





7. Survivability in the Defense. Blade assets are not being fully utilized due to the following:

- ✓ Failure to assign priorities.
- ✓ Lack of control over moving the blade assets between CO/TMs.
- ✓ Failure of CO/TMs to mark their positions prior to blades arriving.
- ✓ No plans for shifting blade assets to another CO/TM when the priority CO/TM is not ready to dig.
- ✓ Poor site selection (dead space, rocky soil, location silhouettes the vehicle).
- ✓ Failure of vehicle crews to assist blade operators in spreading spoil (pushing spoil in from the sides of the position).
- ✓ Failure to proof vehicle positions.

Techniques:

- ☛ Dig a standard two-tier turret position for a M1A1 and M2/3 during an OPD/NCOPD at home station.
- ☛ Ref FM 5-103.

8. Siting Tactical Obstacles. Engineer platoons are siting and emplacing obstacles without the company team commander's involvement. The emplaced obstacles are not covered by direct or indirect fire and often do not meet the desired intent (disrupt, turn, fix, block).

Techniques:


- ☛ Ensure the CO/TM commander participates to achieve synchronization between the obstacle effect and fires.
- ☛ Use the obstacle-coordination checklist in FM 90-7, p. 5-12, to assist coordination between the engineer and company team commander.
- ☛ Make sure that both the engineer and company team commander devote sufficient time to the siting effort.
- ☛ Reference: FM 90-7.

9. Know the Rules of Engagement (ROE). Units and soldiers not knowing the ROE. Just as Bosnia had ROE, so does CMTC.

Techniques:

- ☛ Learn and implement the ROE down to the individual soldier level.
- ☛ This training must be accomplished at home station.

Other engineer units have succeeded in overcoming the problems associated with the transition back to high intensity conflict. Learning from their experiences will put you on the right track.☛



RETURN TO HIGH INTENSITY: OBSERVATIONS MADE OF ONE UNIT'S ROTATION AT CMTC UPON RETURN FROM BOSNIA by CPT Roy Outcalt

BACKGROUND: The commander of the first company-size element returning from Bosnia that I observed at CMTC had previously served as the TF S-4 while deployed in Bosnia. Three of the four platoon leaders and the first sergeant had been in their positions for 60 days or less. The XO and nearly 75 percent of the unit remained in the same positions they held in Bosnia. Five months after returning to Germany from Bosnia, the unit came to CMTC.

DISCUSSION: The successes and failures of this unit were similar to those which most units experience during a CMTC rotation. The following discussion addresses this rotation in terms of battle command, maintenance, and troop morale.

Battle Command. According to FM 17-97, "Effective battle command begins in the planning phase and continues through the execution phase of each mission...." Difficulty with time management and the orders process hindered the unit throughout its rotation.


- The TFs used too much time issuing its own order.
- Frequent changes made to the plan subsequent to execution time.
- Impact was most directly felt at the platoon level. Platoon leaders often did not issue orders until after company-level rehearsals.
- Because of the limited amount of time at the company level, much of the troop-leading procedures were conducted at company level.

RESULT: The unit conducted company-level rehearsals as opposed to platoon-level rehearsals. Effects of this centralized planning at company level were apparent during execution.

EXAMPLE: Whenever leadership lost communication or became a casualty, soldiers at the lowest level were forced to continue execution with little understanding of the chain-of-command's guidance and plans.

- The unit was initially quite weak in rehearsals, but continually improved throughout the rotation and eventually conducted a full, mounted rehearsal before its last mission.
- The unit commander failed to give detailed guidance on what things he specifically wanted rehearsed.
- This left much latitude for junior leaders to develop what they thought important.

RESULT: Junior leaders lost a lot of time early in the rotation by failing to maximize preparation and rehearsal time.



Maintenance. On various missions over 15 days of training, some combat systems were down for maintenance.

- **All vehicles were fixed and returned to action in less than 48 hours.**
- **This ability to conduct sustained operations while continuing to care for equipment is attributed to experience gained while deployed to Bosnia.**
- **Junior leadership maintained appropriate maintenance discipline, had appropriate resources and close supervision by the First Sergeant and the Executive Officer.**

Morale. This assessment is based entirely on discussions between the unit commander and the O/C. It is based on his impressions of the unit.

Positive areas:

- ✓ **Junior leadership**
- ✓ **Tactical proficiency**
- ✓ **Gunnery**
- ✓ **Maintenance**

Areas needing emphasis. The commander believed that the excessive amount of time that his unit had been deployed created issues that plagued unit morale.

● **Troop Strength**

☛ **One M1 tank system could not be fully fielded because of troop shortages.** This tank remained for most of the rotation with the First Sergeant in the combat trains.

☛ **All other tanks were operated with three-man crews.** An acceptable alternative, but guarantees future problems when soldiers are forced to leave the tank as casualties, or because of emergency leave, reassignment, etc.

There is scarcely a commander in the Army who does not wish for more soldiers to help share the workload. But, if this unit had been forced to spend additional time on rotation or to deploy and conduct combat operations, manpower shortfalls would have hindered future missions.

● **Divorce**

☛ **In the five months since the troop had returned from Bosnia, at least six soldiers were in the process of divorce proceedings and at least another 10 soldiers were greatly distracted by personal/family matters.**

☛ **These were specific cases brought to the commander's attention.** There were probably more in his unit. One NCO did leave the troop during the rotation because of extensive family issues. Another soldier was injured during the rotation. It was the consensus in the unit that he was "faking" injury so that he would be sent back to Home Station to solve personal issues.

In these times of increased OPTEMPO, reduction of forces, etc., distracters at the lowest level are sure to increase over time. And their effect on soldiers, leaders, and units will likewise increase. These are not new issues for leaders to cope with. High morale can be a combat multiplier. Low morale can have devastating effects on the success of a unit. In this case, the commander was very concerned about his troop's possible deployment to Bosnia. He was not concerned about the technical and tactical expertise of his unit. As a leader, he cared about the continued pressures on the personal lives of his soldiers and the effect of those distracters on mission accomplishment. And he was determined to find solutions.★